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UAP / Infrastructure
Evidence Dossier

UAP and Drone Reporting at U.S. Nuclear Facilities, 2015 to 2024

Evidence Dossier: A record proves that a statement, transfer, examination, or result was documented. It does not automatically prove the anomalous interpretation attached to it.
OverviewEvidenceTimelineAnalysisSources
2015, 2023, 2024
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Massachusetts, USA, D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Michigan, USA, BWXT Fuel Cycle Facility, Lynchburg, Virginia, USA
9/10
2/10
Unidentified objects reported near U.S. nuclear facilities represent a recurring anomalous or potentially extraordinary incursion pattern.
Strong for the documented incidents, reporting-policy gap, and modern UAS classifications; weak for an extraordinary interpretation because the clearest modern reports were categorized as drones and the 2015 object lacked identifying data.

Investigative Assessments

"The reported claim remains worth testing against the record: Unidentified objects reported near U.S. nuclear facilities represent a recurring anomalous or potentially extraordinary incursion pattern. The strongest documented reasons to keep the file open are: NRC Emails About the 2015 Pilgrim Object: The emails document police, FAA, and state-police-helicopter involvement; the object was high and indiscernible, a weather balloon was suspected, and no one was definite.; NRC Briefing on UAP and UAS Reporting Categories: The briefing says NRC had no security-database category or licensee guidance to distinguish UAS from UAP, creating underreporting and misclassification risk.. Key unresolved lead: What became of the drone recovered at D.C. Cook after transfer to local law enforcement?"
"Evidentiary limitations: Strong for the documented incidents, reporting-policy gap, and modern UAS classifications; weak for an extraordinary interpretation because the clearest modern reports were categorized as drones and the 2015 object lacked identifying data. Note that: NRC Emails About the 2015 Pilgrim Object fails to support: The correspondence does not show that the object was a drone, an extraordinary craft, or a threat to the facility.; NRC Briefing on UAP and UAS Reporting Categories fails to support: The policy gap does not prove that extraordinary objects flew over nuclear facilities.. Documented contradiction: The 2015 subject line called the event a drone spotting, while responders could not identify the object and suspected a weather balloon. Leading conventional hypothesis: A distant weather balloon was the tentative explanation for the 2015 Pilgrim object."

Case Summary

Three official records show how ambiguous flyovers, conventional drones, and UAP reporting were handled around nuclear facilities. A 2015 Pilgrim object remained unidentified but was suspected to be a weather balloon. A 2023 NRC briefing admitted that its reporting system did not distinguish UAS from UAP. AARO’s 2024 report classified all 18 nuclear-infrastructure incidents it received from the reporting agencies as UAS, including a physically recovered crashed drone.

Evidence Locker

3 inspectable evidence items. Claims and source findings are kept separate.

Internal agency correspondence Local copy hash-verified

NRC Emails About the 2015 Pilgrim Object

Analyst rating: Primary record of the event, response, uncertainty, and decision not to create a formal security report

“They think it might have been a weather balloon of some sort, but no one was definite. They are calling it a UFO.”
Record locationPDF pages 1 and 3
Evidence classNRC event correspondence
Relationship to claimDocuments a specific unresolved observation and why it left little structured evidence.
Authenticity assessmentHigh for document authenticity. The relevant email pages were visually checked against the NARA PDF.
What this supportsThe emails document police, FAA, and state-police-helicopter involvement; the object was high and indiscernible, a weather balloon was suspected, and no one was definite.
What it does not supportThe correspondence does not show that the object was a drone, an extraordinary craft, or a threat to the facility.
ProvenanceOfficial NARA UAP bulk-download record, hash-registered in the Casebook manifest and served from the read-only VPS corpus mount.
Chain of custodyPilgrim licensee and local response -> NRC email chain -> NRC transfer to NARA Record Group 615 -> NARA bulk archive -> Casebook.
Open Document (Local PDF Document) Download Copy Canonical Agency Record
Internal policy briefing Local copy hash-verified

NRC Briefing on UAP and UAS Reporting Categories

Analyst rating: Strong primary record of the NRC’s acknowledged historical reporting limitation

“As a result, we have no idea if UAPs are flying over the aerospace of nuclear power plants or Category I fuel cycle facilities.”
Record locationPDF pages 1 to 2
Evidence classNRC policy record
Relationship to claimExplains why historical incident counts cannot cleanly distinguish drones from unidentified phenomena.
Authenticity assessmentHigh for document authenticity. Both briefing pages were visually checked against the NARA PDF.
What this supportsThe briefing says NRC had no security-database category or licensee guidance to distinguish UAS from UAP, creating underreporting and misclassification risk.
What it does not supportThe policy gap does not prove that extraordinary objects flew over nuclear facilities.
ProvenanceOfficial NARA UAP bulk-download record, hash-registered in the Casebook manifest and served from the read-only VPS corpus mount.
Chain of custodyOriginating federal office -> NARA Record Group 615 transfer -> NARA bulk ZIP -> hash-verified VPS extraction -> read-only Casebook mount.
Open Document (Local PDF Document) Download Copy Canonical Agency Record
Annual government report Local copy hash-verified

AARO 2024 Report on UAS Near Nuclear Infrastructure

Analyst rating: Strong official summary of 18 modern incidents and their reporting-agency classifications

“On August 3, 2023, the D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant security recovered a crashed UAS that was given to Berrien County, Michigan, local law enforcement.”
Record locationPDF page 12, printed page 11
Evidence classGovernment annual report
Relationship to claimProvides modern classification data and physical confirmation that at least one incident involved a conventional drone.
Authenticity assessmentHigh for document authenticity. The relevant page was visually checked against the NARA PDF.
What this supportsAARO received 18 reports near nuclear infrastructure, weapons, and launch sites; the NRC and nuclear-security reporting authorities categorized all as UAS.
What it does not supportThe report does not identify the operators or motives in every event, and AARO lacked follow-up information about the recovered D.C. Cook drone.
ProvenanceOfficial NARA UAP bulk-download record, hash-registered in the Casebook manifest and served from the read-only VPS corpus mount.
Chain of custodyOriginating federal office -> NARA Record Group 615 transfer -> NARA bulk ZIP -> hash-verified VPS extraction -> read-only Casebook mount.
Open Document (Local PDF Document) Download Copy Canonical Agency Record

Documented Timeline

  • 2015-09-30 to 2015-10-01: NRC emails tracked an indiscernible high-altitude object near Pilgrim; a weather balloon was suspected but not confirmed.
  • 2015-10-01: NRC personnel closed the matter without a Security Incident Database report because no threat or surveillance criteria were met.
  • 2023-05-01: AARO made its first request to NRC for UAP and UAS flyover data for congressional reporting.
  • 2023-08: NRC staff documented the absence of a reporting category that distinguished UAS from UAP.
  • 2023-08-03: D.C. Cook security recovered a crashed UAS and transferred it to local law enforcement.
  • 2023-10-10 to 2023-10-15: BWXT observed UAS flyovers on six consecutive nights.
  • 2024: AARO reported 18 nuclear-infrastructure incidents supplied by nuclear authorities, all categorized by those authorities as UAS.

Named Participants and Roles

  • Pilgrim security personnel and licensee staff: original observers and facility contacts in the 2015 correspondence.
  • Plymouth Police Department and Massachusetts State Police personnel: responders who could not definitively identify the 2015 object.
  • NRC staff members Raymond Lorson, Dana Caron, Brett Klukan, Anthony Dimitriadis, and John Cherubini: participants named in the archived email chain.
  • NRC and nuclear-security officials: reporting authorities for the 18 incidents summarized by AARO.
  • AARO analysts: recipients and publishers of the 2024 incident summary.

Contradictions and Record Conflicts

  • The 2015 subject line called the event a drone spotting, while responders could not identify the object and suspected a weather balloon.
  • The NRC later acknowledged that its older reporting system did not distinguish UAS from UAP, limiting historical comparisons.
  • Public discussion often treats nuclear-site reports as unexplained UAP, while the 18 modern incidents in AARO’s report were all categorized by the reporting agencies as UAS.

Conventional Explanations

  • A distant weather balloon was the tentative explanation for the 2015 Pilgrim object.
  • Conventional drones explain the 18 modern incidents as classified by the reporting agencies.
  • Birds, aircraft, or other distant objects may have been conflated under older, incomplete reporting categories.

Missing Evidence

  • No formal security incident report, imagery, measurement, or definitive identification survives for the 2015 event.
  • Historical NRC records were not structured to separate UAS from UAP.
  • AARO reported no further information about the physically recovered D.C. Cook drone.

What Remains Unresolved

  • The 2015 Pilgrim object remained unidentified in the acquired correspondence.
  • The prevalence of historical UAP reports near nuclear facilities cannot be reliably calculated from the old reporting system.
  • The operators and motives behind the modern UAS incidents are not resolved by the acquired records.

Investigative Hypotheses

  • Most modern incursions were conventional drones or UAS
  • The 2015 Pilgrim object was a weather balloon or another distant conventional object
  • Some historical events may have remained genuinely unidentified because reporting categories and evidence collection were inadequate

Open Questions

  • What became of the drone recovered at D.C. Cook after transfer to local law enforcement?
  • Can older NRC reports be re-reviewed to separate UAS from genuinely unidentified events?
  • Why were no formal measurements or imagery preserved for the 2015 Pilgrim observation?

Archival Landing Pages and Evidence Corpus

NARA Record Group 615, Nuclear Regulatory Commission UAP Records

Official Bulk Archive

External URL: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/488808322

NARA Record Group 615, Office of the Secretary of Defense UAP Records

Official Bulk Archive

External URL: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/493468580